Abstract. Sponsored search auctions are the main source of revenue for search engines. In such an auction, a set of utility-maximizing advertisers compete for a set of ad slots. The assignment of advertisers to slots depends on bids they submit; these bids may be different than the true valuations of the advertisers for the slots. Variants of the celebrated VCG auction mechanism guarantee that advertisers act truthfully and, under mild assumptions, lead to revenue or social welfare maximization. Still, the sponsored search industry mostly uses generalized second price (GSP) auctions; these auctions are known to be non-truthful and suboptimal in terms of social welfare and revenue. In an attempt to explain this tradition, we study a Bayesian setting where the valuations of advertisers are drawn independently from a regular probability distribution. In this setting, it is well known by the work of Myerson (1981) that the optimal revenue is obtained by the VCG mechanism with a particular reserve price that depends on the probability distribution. We show that by appropriately setting the reserve price, the revenue over any BayesNash equilibrium of the game induced by the GSP auction is at most a small constant fraction of the optimal revenue, improving recent results of Lucier, Paes Leme, and Tardos (2012). Our analysis is based on the Bayes-Nash equilibrium conditions and on the properties of regular probability distributions.
Introduction
The sale of advertising space is the main source of income for information providers on the Internet. For example, a query to a search engine creates advertising space that is sold to potential advertisers through auctions that are known as sponsored search auctions (or ad auctions). In their influential papers, Edelman et al. [6] and Varian [18] have proposed a (now standard) model for this process. According to this model, a set of utility-maximizing advertisers compete for a set of ad slots with non-increasing click-through rates. The auctioneer collects bids from the advertisers and assigns them to slots This work is co-financed by the European Social Fund and Greek national funds through the research funding program Thales on "Algorithmic Game Theory".
(usually, in non-increasing order of their bids). In addition, it assigns a payment per click to each advertiser. Depending on the way the payments are computed, different auctions can be defined. Typical examples are the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG), the generalized second price (GSP), and the generalized first price (GFP) auction. Naturally, the advertisers are engaged as players in a strategic game defined by the auction; the bid submitted by each player is such that it maximizes her utility (i.e., the total difference of her valuation minus her payment over all clicks) given the bids of the other players. This behavior leads to equilibria, i.e., states of the induced game from which no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate.
Traditionally, truthfulness has been recognized as an important desideratum in the Economics literature on auctions [11] . In truthful auctions, truth-telling is an equilibrium according to specific equilibrium notions (e.g., dominant strategy, Nash, or Bayes-Nash equilibrium). Such a mechanism guarantees that the social welfare (i.e., the total value of the players) is maximized. VCG is a typical example of a truthful auction [5, 8, 19] . In contrast, GSP auctions are not truthful [6, 18] ; still, they are the main auction mechanisms used in the sponsored search industry adopted by leaders such as Google and Yahoo!
In an attempt to explain this prevalence, several papers have provided bounds on the social welfare of GSP auctions [2,12,13,17] over different classes of equilibria (pure Nash, coarse-correlated, Bayes-Nash). The main message from these studies is that the social welfare is always a constant fraction of the optimal one. However, one would expect that revenue (as opposed to social welfare) maximization is the major concern from the point of view of the sponsored search industry. In this paper, following the recent paper by Lucier et al. [14] , we aim to provide a theoretical justification for the wide adoption of GSP by focusing on the revenue generated by these auctions.
In order to model the inherent uncertainty in advertisers' beliefs, we consider a Bayesian setting where the advertisers have random valuations drawn independently from a common probability distribution. This is the classical setting that has been studied extensively since the seminal work of Myerson [15] for singleitem auctions (which is a special case of ad auctions). The results of [15] carry over to our model as follows. Under mild assumptions, the revenue generated by a player in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium depends only on the distribution of the click-through rate of the ad slot the player is assigned to for her different valuations. Hence, two Bayes-Nash equilibria that correspond to the same allocation yield the same revenue even if they are induced by different auction mechanisms; this statement is known as revenue equivalence. The allocation that optimizes the expected revenue is one in which low-bidding advertisers are excluded and the remaining ones are assigned to ad slots in non-increasing order of their valuations. Such an allocation is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the variation of the VCG mechanism where an appropriate reserve price (the Myerson reserve) is set in order to exclude the low-bidding advertisers.
GSP auctions may lead to different Bayes-Nash equilibria [7] in which a player with a higher valuation is assigned with positive probability to a slot with lower
